We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alternatives and voters. In particular, we show the following.
Introduction
The one-dimensional Euclidean preference domain (also known as the unidimensional unfolding domain) is a spatial model of structured preferences which originates from economics [16, 15] , political sciences [20, 6, 4] , and psychology [13, 5] . In this domain, the alternatives and the voters are points in a one-dimensional space, i.e. on the real line, such that the preference of each voter towards an alternative decreases as the Euclidean distance between their points increases.
One-dimensional Euclidean preferences are necessarily single-peaked [2] and single-crossing [19] as proven by Coombs [13] , Doignon and Falmagne [14] , Chen et al. [12] . The reverse, however, does not hold. In his work, Coombs [13] provided a sample preference profile with 16 voters and 6 alternatives that is single-peaked and single-crossing, but not one-dimensional Euclidean. This counterexample appears to be quite large for real world scenarios. For instance, in rank aggregation or winner determination elections, one typically either has few alternatives to begin with, or may consolidate first make a shortlist of only a few alternatives out of many, which will be considered for the final decision. There are also settings where only a few voters are involved, as for instance in a hiring committee or when planning holidays for a family. Hence, a natural question arising in the context of one-dimensional Euclidean preferences is whether for profiles with less than 16 voters or less than 6 alternatives, being single-peaked and single-crossing is sufficient to guarantee a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding. In other words, we are interested in the following question: Are there tight upper bounds on the number of alternatives or voters such that profiles within these bounds are one-dimensional Euclidean as long as they are single-peaked and single-crossing? Recently, Chen et al. [12] provided a single-peaked and single-crossing profile with three voters and six alternatives that is not one-dimensional Euclidean. In this paper, we show that this counterexample is indeed minimal in terms of the number of voters and the number of alternatives. In terms of the number of voters, we provide an algorithm that constructs a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding for any single-peaked preference profile with two voters (see Algorithm 1) . As for the number of alternatives, we show via computer program that all single-peaked and single-crossing preferences with up to five alternatives are one-dimensional Euclidean (see Theorem 3) . We refer to the work of Bredereck et al. [8] and the literature cited there for further discussion of the single-peaked and the single-crossing preference domains.
Paper outline. In Section 2, we introduce necessary definitions, including single-peaked and single-crossing preferences, and the one-dimensional Euclidean representation. We also discuss some fundamental observations regarding these domain restrictions. In Section 3, we formulate our first main result in Theorems 1 and 2. We prove this result by providing an algorithm (see Algorithm 1) that constructs a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding for any two preference orders which are single-peaked. At the end of the section, we provide an example to illustrate Algorithm 1 (see Example 3) . In Section 4, we provide our second main result by describing the computer program that finds all possible preference profiles with up to five alternatives that are both single-peaked and single-crossing, and uses the publicly available CPLEX solver to provide a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding for each of theser profiles (see Theorem 3) . The code and the embeddings for all produced profiles are available from https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/rSNKkm8dtPkRKnE and https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/ArdQzFd8J6L5YFN, respectively.
Definitions and notations
Let A := {1, . . . , m} be a set of alternatives. A preference order ≻ over A is a linear order over A; a linear order is a binary relation which is total, irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Given a preference order ≻, we use to denote the binary relation which includes ≻ and preserves the reflexivity, i.e. :=≻ ∪{(a, a) | a ∈ A}. An alternative c is the most preferred alternative in ≻ if for each alternative b ∈ A it holds that a b. For two distinct alternatives a and b, the relation a ≻ b means that a is strictly preferred to (or in other words, ranked higher than) b. The notion {a, b} ≻ i c means that both a and b are strictly preferred to (or in other words, ranked higher than) c, but the preference relation between alternatives a and b is arbitrary but unique.
A preference profile P specifies the preference orders of some voters over some alternatives. Formally, P := (A, V, R := (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n )), where A denotes the set of m alternatives, V denotes the set of n voters, and R is a collection of n preference orders such that each voter v i ∈ V ranks the alternatives according to the preference order ≻ i on A. We also assume that no two voters in a preference profile have the same preference orders.
Slightly abusing the terminology, we say that two preference orders are single-peaked if there is a linear order with respect to which each of these two preference orders is single-peaked.
The single-peaked property can be characterized by two forbidden subprofiles, worst-diverse configurations and α-configurations [1] . The former is defined on three preference orders while the latter is defined on two preference orders. By the α-configuration, for two arbitrary preference orders ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 , we can observe the following. Lemma 1. Two preference orders, denoted as ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 , on the set A are single-peaked if and only if for all four distinct alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ A such that x ≻ 1 y ≻ 1 z and z ≻ 2 y ≻ 2 x it holds that y ≻ 1 w or y ≻ 2 w.
Single-crossing property
Single-crossing profiles date back to the seventies, when Mirrlees [18] and Roberts [19] observed that voters voting on income taxation may form a linear order such that between each two tax rates, the voters along the order either all agree on the relative positions of both rates, or there is one spot where the voters switch from preferring one rate to preferring the other rate.
Definition 2 (single-crossing property).
A linear order of voters is single-crossing with respect to a pair {a, b} of alternatives, if there is at most one voter in this order such that all voters ordered ahead of this voter strictly prefer a to b, and all voters not ordered ahead of this voters strictly prefer b to a.
A linear order of voters is a single-crossing order, if it is single-crossing with respect to every possible pair of alternatives. A preference profile is single-crossing if it allows a single-crossing order of the voters.
The single-crossing property can be characterized by two forbidden subprofiles, γ-configurations and δ-configurations [7] .
One-dimensional Euclidean representation
Definition 3 (one-dimensional Euclidean representation). Let P := (A, V := {v 1 , . . . , v n }, R := (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n )) be a preference profile. Let E : A ∪ V → R be an embedding of the alternatives and the voters into the real line where each two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A have different values, that is, E(a) = E(b). A voter v i ∈ V is one-dimensional Euclidean with respect to E if for each two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A voter v i strictly prefers the one closer to him, that is,
An embedding E of the alternatives and voters is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of profile P if each voter in V is one-dimensional Euclidean with respect to E.
A profile is one-dimensional Euclidean if it has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation.
The one-dimensional Euclidean definition implies the following.
Observation 1 ([12]).
A voter v i ∈ V is one-dimensional Euclidean with respect to an embedding E of the alternatives and voters if and only if for each two distinct alternatives a and b with a
The following observation regarding the relation between single-peaked and single-crossing profiles and the one-dimensional Euclidean representation is also known from the literature [13, 14, 12] .
Observation 2. If a profile is one-dimensional Euclidean, then it is also single-peaked and singlecrossing.
Proof. It is straight-forward to see that if there is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation E of a given profile, then this profile is single-peaked with respect to the order induced by ordering the alternatives according to their values in E. Moreover, it is single-crossing with respect to the order induced by ordering the voters according to their values in E.
3 Single-peaked profiles with two voters are one-dimensional Euclidean
In this section, we formulate and prove our first main result.
Theorem 1. Given a profile with two voters v 1 and v 2 whose preference orders ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are single-peaked, Algorithm 1 returns a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of this profile.
We can conclude the following from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. A profile P with two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only if it is singlepeaked.
Proof. The "only if" part follows from Observation 2 and the "if" part follows from Theorem 1.
In the remainder of this section, we show the correctness of Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 and some technical results
The general idea behind the algorithm in Theorem 1 is to first embed all inner alternatives that are ranked by both voters v 1 and v 2 between a 1 and b 1 , and embed voter v 1 (resp. v 2 ) to the left of alternative a 1 (resp. to right of alternative b 1 ). Then, the algorithm extends the embedding by successively embedding some appropriately selected alternatives to the left or to the right of the already embedded alternatives so as to obtain an extended embedding with respect to which one of the voters is one-dimensional Euclidean. The single-peaked property, according to Lemma 1, guarantees that the extension by these alternatives remains a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for the other voter. We introduce the following notion.
Definition 4 (Inner alternatives). Let ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 be two preference orders, and let a 1 and b 1 be the most preferred alternatives of ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 , respectively. The set of inner alternatives of ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 , denoted as inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), is the set of all alternatives that are ranked between a 1 and b 1 by both ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 :
Example 1. Consider two preference orders ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 with 1
The set of inner alternatives by ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 is inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) = {1, 3}. 
/* Initialize the embedding by starting with the voters and the 'inner' alternatives. */
2
Let p ← 1
until E(c) defined for all alternative c /* Refine positions for preference order ≻ */ 15 Refine(≻ : c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm, v ∈ {v1, v2}): 
We observe the following properties concerning the inner alternatives of two single-peaked preferences.
Lemma 2. Consider two preference orders ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 .
(1) For each r ∈ {1, 2}, the most preferred alternative of ≻ r belongs to inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ).
(2) For each two distinct inner alternatives x, y ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) and for an arbitrary alternative z distinct from x and y it holds that if z ≻ 1 x and z ≻ 2 x, then z ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ).
(3) If ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are single-peaked, then for each two distinct inner alternatives x, y ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) it holds that x ≻ 1 y if and only if y ≻ 2 x.
Proof. The first statement follows from the definition of inner.
As to the second statement, since x ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), if z ≻ 1 x and z ≻ 2 x, then by the transitivity of preference orders, it follows that z 1 b 1 and z 2 a 1 . By the definition of inner, we immediately have that z ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ).
It remains to show the last statement. If a 1 = b 1 , then by the definition of inner it holds that inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) = {a 1 } = {b 1 }, and the second statement holds immediately since inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) has only one alternative. Thus, let us assume that a 1 = b 1 so that |inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 )| ≥ 2. Let ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 be single-peaked. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) with x ≻ 1 y and x ≻ 2 y-the case with y ≻ 1 x and y ≻ 2 x works analogously. Since a 1 ≻ 1 b 1 and b 1 ≻ 2 a 1 , it follows that x, y / ∈ {a 1 , b 1 }. By the definition of a 1 and b 1 and since x, y ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), this implies that
Now, we are ready to describe Algorithm 1. It consists of two parts, the initialization and the main loop. In the initialization, we embed all inner alternatives (see Lines 2-6) in such a way that the left-to-right (resp. the right-to-left) order corresponds to the preferences of v 2 (resp. v 1 ). By Lemma 2 (3), it follows that the most preferred alternative of v 1 , denoted as a 1 , is the right-most alternative, while the most preferred alternative of v 2 , denoted as b 1 , is the left-most alternative. Then, in Lines 7-8 we embed voter v 2 (resp. v 1 ) to the left of a 1 (resp. to the right of b 1 ). Summarizing, we observe the following about the initialization step. 
Proof. The first three statements follow directly from Lines 3-6 and from the definition of inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ). Moreover, it holds that E(c 1 ) = 1, E(c x ) = |inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 )|, E(v 2 ) = 0, and E(v 1 ) = |inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 )| + 1. This implies the fourth statement.
As to the last statement, consider an arbitrary embedded alternative c j with j ∈ {1, . . . , x − 1}. Then, by the second statement, we have that c j ≻ 2 c j+1 . By Lemma 2(3), we have that c j+1 ≻ 1 c j .
After having embedded all inner alternatives, the main loop (Lines 9-14) extends the embedding by alternatingly placing alternatives that should be embedded to the right of the existing embedding and alternatives that should be embedded to the left of the existing embedding. The corresponding procedure is called Refine() (Lines 15-28) and is used for both voters v 1 and v 2 . It searches through the alternatives along the preference order of v 1 (resp. v 2 ), finds the first not-yet-embedded alternative(s) that are ranked between two consecutive embedded alternatives by v 1 (resp. v 2 ), and embeds them to the right (resp. left) of the right-most (resp. left-most) alternative. Fallback() in Line 13 guarantees that at least one alternative is embedded during each iteration, thus ensuring that the algorithm terminates.
In the following, we prove that our constructed embedding is indeed a one-dimensional Euclidean representation by showing that whenever the embedding at the beginning of an iteration of the main loop is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation with regard to the already embedded alternatives, the embedding at the end of the iteration is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation. To this end, let D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d w } be the alternatives that are embedded at the beginning of an iteration (Line 9) with E(d 1 ) < E(d 2 ) < · · · < E(d w ), and assume that E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for all alternatives from D. We introduce the following notation regarding the concept of a worst alternative among a given set of alternatives. Let worst(D, v 1 ) (resp. worst (D, v 2 ) ) denote the alternative from D that is least preferred by voter v 1 (resp. v 2 ) i.e.
Example 2. Consider the following preferences of voters v 1 and v 2 .
We introduce another notion called no later than.
Definition 5 (No later than). For two distinct alternatives x and y, we say that x is embedded no later than y if one of the following holds.
(1) Alternatives x and y are both embedded during initialization.
(2) They are both embedded in the same call to Refine().
(3) When y is to be embedded, E(x) is already defined.
To show that each iteration (Lines 9-14) maintains the one-dimensional Euclidean property of the embedding, we observe the following useful properties.
Lemma 3. Let x and y be two distinct alternatives with x ≻ 1 y and x ≻ 2 y. Then, Algorithm 1 embeds x no later than y.
Proof. If y ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), then by Lemma 2 (2), it follows that x ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), meaning that x and y are both embedded during the initialization, and that x is embedded no later than y. Now, let us assume that y / ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ). Consider the step when y was embedded. There are three cases.
If y has been embedded in Line 21 in a call to Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ), then let j and i be the indices as defined in that call such that a j 1 y ≻ 1 a i . If E(x) was defined, i.e. x has already been embedded, then by the definition of "no later than", x is embedded no later than y. If E(x) was not defined, then since a j was defined as the first alternative that is not yet embedded, it follows that a j 1 x. Since x ≻ 1 y, it follows that a j ≻ 1 x ≻ 1 y ≻ 1 a i , implying that x is embedded in the same call to Refine () as y. Thus, x is embedded no later than y.
Using a reasoning similar to the previous case, we can infer that x is also embedded no later than y when y has been embedded in call to Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ) because x ≻ 2 y.
If y has been embedded in the subprocedure Fallback() in Line 13, meaning that it is also the only alternative that is embedded during that iteration, then line 30 guarantees that E(x) was already defined, and thus, x is embedded no later than y.
The next lemma ensures that each alternative not from inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) is embedded by exactly one of the three subroutines-Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ), Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ), or Fallback().
Lemma 4. Let ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 be two single-peaked preference orders. Consider an arbitrary not-yetembedded alternative x, i.e. x / ∈ D. Then, worst(D,
Proof. Let a * = worst(D, ≻ 1 ) and b * = worst(D, ≻ 2 ). Towards a contradiction, suppose that ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are single-peaked but x is an alternative with x / ∈ D such that x ≻ 1 a * and x ≻ 2 b * .
This implies that
as a 1 ≻ 1 x and b 1 ≻ 2 x; recall that a 1 (resp. b 1 ) is the alternative most preferred by voter v 1 (resp. v 2 ). By Lemma 3 and since x is not yet embedded, the assumption (1) also implies that
By the definitions of a 1 and b 1 , we further infer that
We distinguish between two cases, in each case aiming to obtain x ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) which is a contradiction to x / ∈ D as inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) ⊆ D. Case 1: If a 1 = b * , then the preferences given in (5) are equivalent to
Furthermore, b 1 = a * as otherwise x ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 )-a contradiction. Consequently, the preferences given in (6) imply that
Since ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are single-peaked, by Lemma 1 and by (7), we must have that x ≻ 1 b 1 . However, this implies that x ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) since x ≻ 2 a 1 -a contradiction. Case 2: If a 1 = b * , then the preferences given in (5) imply that
Since ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are single-peaked, by Lemma 1 and by (8), we must have that x ≻ 2 a 1 and x ≻ 1 b 1 , implying that x ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 )-a contradiction.
For two distinct alternatives that have not been embedded, we observe the following.
Lemma 5. Let ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 be two single-peaked preference orders. Let x and y be two distinct alternatives that have not been embedded, i.e. x, y / ∈ D with x = y. For each r ∈ {1, 2} it holds that if x ≻ r y ≻ r worst(D, ≻ r ), then worst(D, ≻ s ) ≻ s x ≻ s y, where s ∈ {1, 2} \ {r}.
Proof. Assume that x ≻ r y ≻ r worst(D, ≻ r ) holds. Let best(≻ r ) be the most preferred alternative in the preference order ≻ r . Then, we have that
By Lemma 4, it follows that worst(D, ≻ s ) ≻ s {x, y}. Thus, it remains to show that x ≻ s y. Towards a contradiction, suppose that y ≻ s x. By the definition of worst(D, ≻ s ), voter v s must have preferences
Together with (9), we have best(r) ≻ r x ≻ r y ≻ r worst(D, ≻ r ), and {best(r), worst(D, ≻ r )} ≻ s y ≻ s x, a contradiction to Lemma 1.
We observe the following for the subprocedure Refine(≻, v).
Lemma 6. Let j and i be as defined in a call to Refine(≻, v). If E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for the alternatives c j−1 and c i and for the voter v so that the 1-Euclidean property is satisfied, then |E(
Proof. By the definitions of j and i, since the 1-Euclidean property is maintained for voter v, it holds that
Note that dist(j − 1) and dist(i) are defined in Lines 19-20. From Lines 23-25, it is straightforward to verify that for each c k with j − 1 ≤ k ≤ i,
Combining (12) with (11), we obtain the chain of inequalities in the lemma.
Correctness of Theorem 1
From Lemma 6, we know that Refine(≻, v) ensures the one-dimensional Euclidean property for voter v with regard to the already embedded and the newly added alternatives. Together with Lemmas 3 to 5, we are ready to show the correctness of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 be single-peaked. First of all, by Proposition 1, the initialization phase computes a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of the two preference orders ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 when restricted to the inner alternatives inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ). Thus, to prove the correctness, we only need to show that each iteration of the main loop (Lines 9-14) returns an extended embedding that is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of the embedded alternatives. To achieve this, we need to show that the procedures Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ), Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ), and Lines 31-32 extend the existing one-dimensional Euclidean representation to one that is one-dimensional Euclidean with respect to the alternatives that have already been embedded and also with respect to those which are newly embedded. To this end, let D be the alternatives that are embedded at the beginning of an iteration, and assume that E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for all alternatives in D. Let a * = worst(D, v 1 ) (resp. b * = worst(D, v 2 )) denote the alternative from D that is least preferred by voter v 1 (resp. v 2 ). Let C be the set of alternatives that are to be embedded. We distinguish between three cases. Case 1: C has been embedded in a call to Refine (≻ 1 , v 1 ) . By the procedure Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ), the two embedded alternatives that the algorithm identifies are a j and a i such that C = {a j , a j+1 , . . . , a i−1 } and
By assumption, the embedding E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voters v 1 and v 2 and for the alternatives from D. By Lemma 6, it follows that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v 1 and for all alternatives from D ∪ C. In particular, it holds that,
It remains to show that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v 2 and for all alternatives from D ∪ C. Using Lemma 5 on the preferences in (13), voter v 2 must have preferences b * ≻ 2 a j ≻ 2 a j+1 ≻ 2 · · · ≻ 2 a i−1 . By the embedding of the alternatives from C (Line 23), for each alternative a k with j ≤ k ≤ i − 1 it holds that
implying that |E(a k )−E(v 2 )| < |E(a k+1 −E(v 2 ))|. Thus, to show that E remains a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v 2 regarding the alternatives from D ∪ C, we only need to show that
then we can derive that
which is what we needed to show. Thus, the only task remained is to show that (16) holds. We distinguish between two cases. If b * ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), then b * 2 a 1 . By the definition of b * , this implies b * = a 1 , and thus b * 1 a j−1 as a 1 is the first alternative in ≻ 1 .
If b * / ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), then b * was embedded during a previous iteration of the main loop. Let us consider this iteration where b * was embedded. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that a j−1 ≻ 1 b * . By the definition of a j , it follows that a j ≻ 1 a j+1 ≻ 1 · · · ≻ 1 a i−1 ≻ 1 b * . Since a j will be embedded later than b * , it follows that Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ) returned false. However, Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ) also returned false since no alternative b i ′ exists that is embedded before b * such that b * ≻ 2 b i ′ . Finally, the subprocedure Fallback() in Line 13 could not have applied since there a j remained unembedded during this iteration but a j ≻ 1 b * . Thus, there is no way b * could have been embedded -a contradiction. Summarizing, we have shown that b * 1 a j−1 . This completes the proof for the first case.
Case 2: C has been embedded in a call to Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ). The reasoning is very similar to the one for Case 1. The two embedded alternatives identified by the algorithm are b j and b i such that C = {b j , b j+1 , . . . , b i−1 } and
By assumption, the embedding E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voters v 1 and v 2 and for the alternatives from D. By Lemma 6, it follows that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v 2 and for all alternatives from D ∪ C. In particular, it holds that,
It remains to show that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v 1 and for all alternatives from D ∪ C. Using Lemma 5 on the preferences in (17) 
implying that |E(
show that E remains a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v 1 regarding the alternatives from D ∪ C, we only need to show that |E(
which is what we needed to show. Thus, the only task remaining is to show that (20) holds. We distinguish between two cases. If a * ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), then a * 1 b 1 . By the definition of a * , this implies a * = b 1 , and it follows that a * 2 b j−1 as b 1 is the first alternative in ≻ 2 .
If a * / ∈ inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ), then a * was embedded during a previous iteration of the main loop. Let us consider the iteration where a * was embedded. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
Since a * is the embedded alternative least preferred one v 1 , it follows that Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ) returned false. However, when Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ) was called, all alternatives preferred to a * by v 2 must not be embedded later than a * -a contradiction since b j will be embedded later than a * . Summarizing, we have shown that a * 2 b j−1 . This completes the proof of the second case. Case 3: C has been embedded in a call to Fallback(). Thus, it must hold that
We infer that C = {a j } where j = |D| + 1, and that
To show the one-dimensional Euclidean property, we only need to show that |E(
By Lines 30-32, it holds that a * = a j−1 . Thus, we infer that
By the definition of a * and b * voter v 1 has preferences
Since E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for the voter v 2 and for the alternatives in d, this implies the following.
To conclude, we have shown that in each case the algorithm extends the embedding so that the resulting embedding is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of both voters and of the alternatives already embedded as well as the newly embedded alternatives. Thus, our algorithm indeed computes a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of two voters whose preferences are single-peaked.
Example 3. We illustrate our algorithm using the profile from Example 2, with two voters and eight alternatives:
It is single-peaked with respect to the order ⊲ with 8 ⊲ 6 ⊲ 3 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 1 ⊲ 4 ⊲ 7, and also with respect to the reverse of ⊲. Given this profile as input, our algorithm will return a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding which is depicted in the following line. First of all, our algorithm embeds the inner alternatives inner(≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ) = {1, 2, 3} between voter v 1 at 4 and voter v 2 at 0.
In iteration 1, alternative 4 is embedded to the right of voter v 1 , as it is the first not-yetembedded alternative in the preferences of v 1 and there is an embedded alternative, namely 2, such that v 1 prefers 4 to 2.
After alternative 4 has been embedded, alternatives 5 and 6 are embedded to the left of the left-most alternative, namely 3. This is because v 1 prefers each embedded alternative to each notyet-embedded alternative (i.e. Refine(≻, v 1 ) would return false). Alternatives 5 and 6 are the first not-yet-embedded alternatives in the preference order of v 2 , and there is an embedded alternative, namely 4, such that v 2 prefers {5, 6} to 4.
In iteration 2, that is, after alternatives 5 and 6 have been embedded, neither Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ) nor Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ) return true. Alternative 7 is the first not-yet-embedded alternative in the preference order of v 1 . Thus, the Fallback() function embeds 7 to the right of v 1 so that it becomes the right-most alternative.
Finally, in iteration 3, Refine(≻ 1 , v 1 ) returns false. Then, in Refine(≻ 2 , v 2 ), alternative 8 is embedded to the left of the left-most alternative, namely 6, as 8 is the first not-yet-embedded alternative in the preferences of v 2 and there is an embedded alternative, namely 7, such that v 2 prefers alternative 8 to 7.
The following table summarizes how the algorithm proceeds with the above profile as input. More precisely, row one shows the iteration in increasing order; row two shows which subprocedure in the specific iteration has embedded some alternatives (row three).
For each alternative in row three, the embedding of this alternative is depicted in the last row.
Iteration
Embedded alt. 4 Single-peaked and single-crossing profiles with up to five alternatives
In this section, we state and prove our second main result concerning preference profiles with up to five alternatives.
Theorem 3. Each preference profile with up to five alternatives is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only if it is single-peaked and single-crossing.
Proof. As already discussed in the introduction, a one-dimensional Euclidean profile necessarily is single-peaked and single-crossing. Thus, to show the theorem, it suffices to show that every singlepeaked and single-crosssing preference profile with up to five alternatives is also one-dimensional Euclidean. We achieve this by using a computer program that exhaustively searches for all possible single-peaked and single-crossing profiles with up to five alternatives and provide a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding for each of them. We did some optimization to shrink our search space extensively. First of all, we only consider profiles with at least two alternatives and at least two voters who have pairwise distinct preference orders as two voters with the same preference order can be embedded at the same position without losing the one-dimensional Euclidean property. Since the relevant profiles in consideration must be single-crossing, by [ Second, we assume that one of the preference orders in the sought profile is 1 ≻ 2 ≻ . . . ≻ m. We denote this order as the canonical preference order.
Third, using the monotonicity of the single-peaked property, we consider adding a preference order (there are m! − 1 many) to form a potential relevant single-peaked and single-crossing profile m   n 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11   3  5  6  2  -------4  19 69  108  90  39  7  ----5  69 567 2124 4810 7185 7273 4969 2196 570 66   Table 1 : For each number m of alternatives stated in the first column and for each number n of voters stated in the first row, 3 ≤ m ≤ 5 and 2 ≤ n ≤ m 2 + 1, we summarize the number of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles we have produced that contain the canonical preference order 1 ≻ 2 ≻ · · · ≻ m and no two voters that have the same preference orders. For instance, when m = 3 and n = 4, the number of sought preference profiles is 2, as indicated in row two and column four. Table 1 . Note that we include profiles which have two voters although by Theorem 1 all single-peaked and single-crossing preference profile with two voters are one-dimensional Euclidean.
We implemented a program which, for each of these produced profiles, uses the IBM ILOG CPLEX optimization software package to check and find a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding. The results can be found in https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/ArdQzFd8J6L5YFN and can be verified via the program given in https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/rSNKkm8dtPkRKnE.
Conclusion and outlook
We have shown that for profiles with at most five alternatives or at most two voters, being singlepeaked and single-crossing suffices for being one-dimensional Euclidean. Our research leads to some interesting follow up questions. First of all, using our computer program from Section 4 we can produce all single-peaked and single-crossing profiles and all one-dimensional Euclidean profiles. A natural question is to count the number of structured (e.g. single-peaked, singlecrossing, one-dimensional Euclidean) preference profiles and provide a closed formula in terms of the number m of alternatives and the number n of voters, in a similar spirit as recent work by Lackner and Lackner [17] and Chen and Finnendahl [11] .
Second, both the single-peaked and the single-crossing property can be characterized by a few small forbidden subprofiles [1, 7] . However, this is not the case for the one-dimensional Euclidean property [12] . Thus we ask: is it possible to characterize small one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles via a few forbidden subprofiles? Chen [10, Chapter 4.11] provided a generic construction and showed that there are at least n! single-peaked and single-crossing profiles with n = m/2 voters and m alternatives that are not one-dimensional Euclidean. For m = 6, this number would be 6. However, through our computer program we found that for m = 6 and n = 3, out of 4179 singlepeaked and single-crossing preference profiles, there are 48 ones which are not one-dimensional Euclidean, which is more than 6.
Last but not least, for d ≥ 2, d-dimensional Euclidean profiles are not necessarily single-peaked nor single-crossing [4] . In other words, the forbidden subprofiles that are used to characterize singlepeaked or single-crossing profiles are not of use to characterize d-dimensional Euclidean profiles. This leads to the question of sufficient and necessary conditions for profiles to be d-dimensional Euclidean. Bogomolnaia and Laslier [4] answered this question for profiles that may contain ties. Bulteau and Chen [9] used a computer program to verify that all preference profiles with up to seven alternatives and up to three voters are 2-dimensional Euclidean.
